




Extent, Location, and Characteristics of Land 











Selected paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association 













Copyright 2005 by Roger Claassen, Ruben Lubowski, and Michael Roberts.  All rights reserved.  
Readers  may  make  verbatim  copies  of  this  document  for  non-commercial  purposes  by  any 
means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
                                                 
*  Economic  Research  Service,  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture.    Senior  authorship  is  not  assigned.    Direct 
correspondence to: Ruben Lubowski, USDA-ERS, 1800 M Street, NW, Room S4177, Washington, DC. 20036.  
Tel: (202) 694-5479. Fax: (202) 694-5775. Email: rlubowski@ers.usda.gov.  The authors thank Erik O’Donoghue 
and Shawn Bucholtz for comments and assistance.  Views expressed are the authors alone and do not necessarily 








Extent, Location, and Characteristics of Land Cropped Due to Insurance Subsidies 
Roger Claassen, Ruben N. Lubowski, and Michael J. Roberts 
 
Abstract 
We  examine  changes  in  land  use  caused  by  the  large  increase  in  crop  insurance  premium 
subsidies  under  the  Federal  Crop  Insurance  and  Reform  Act  (FCIRA)  of  1994.    We  use  a 
conditional logit model to estimate changes in six major land uses from 1992 and 1997 as a 
function of the change in expected return to crop insurance.  Our data on individual land parcels 
across  the  entire  coterminous  United  States  enable  identification of  the  extent,  location,  and 
physical characteristics of the land brought into and retained in production as a result of the crop 
insurance policies.  Results indicate the additional crop insurance premium subsidies increased 
cultivated cropland area on the order of 1.9 million acres (0.6%), consistent with the lower range 
of previous estimates of crop insurance acreage effects.  The estimated lands in production due to 
the subsidy increases are of lower quality than cropland overall in term of both Land Capability 
Classification and proneness to flooding, as well as more environmentally sensitive in terms of 
erodibility and proportion in wetlands (G220, Q150, Q180, Q240, R140). 
 
Key words: crop insurance; crop insurance subsidies; Federal Crop Insurance and Reform Act 
(FCIRA); land use; land-use change; National Resources Inventory (NRI).   3 
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Roger Claassen, Ruben N. Lubowski, and Michael J. Roberts 
Introduction 
Subsidized  crop  insurance  has  long  been  thought  to  encourage  crop  production  on 
economically marginal land.  A number of researchers have drawn connections between the 
amount of land in crop production and crop insurance (Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal 2004; 
Goodwin and Smith 2003; Keeton et al. 1999; Wu 1999; Young et al. 1999; Griffin 1996).  All 
have noted the potential for additional environmental damage due to expanded crop production, 
particularly if marginal land is also environmentally sensitive.  In a 1999 letter to Congress, 
twenty-seven conservation and taxpayer groups also opposed additional crop insurance subsidies 
on  the  grounds  that  these,  “…would  create  strong  incentives  to  crop  millions  of  acres  of 
environmentally  sensitive  flood  or  drought-prone  pastureland  and  wildlife  habitat” 
(Environmental  Defense  1999).
1    The  contention  is  that  crop  insurance  tends  to  increase 
cultivation on lands where growing crops is particularly risky, and that these are also where 
crops are particularly damaging to the environment.  
In this paper, we exploit exogenous variation in insurance adoption caused by a rapid 
increase  in  insurance  subsidies  to  estimate  the  effect  of  crop  insurance  on  land  use.    This 
approach allows us to isolate the impact of crop insurance policies and control for unobserved 
factors that affect cropping decisions.  The use of parcel-level data on land use also facilitates 
identification of the locations and physical and environmental characteristics of land brought into 
production and retained in production as a result of crop insurance policies. 
Our approach contrasts with an existing literature on land-use effects from crop insurance 
that  has  chiefly  relied  on  county-level  data  and  has  not  identified  the  environmental 
characteristics of lands affected by the crop insurance policies.  Previous studies, including one 
of the few farm-level analyses (Wu 1999), focus on particular subsets of crops and relatively 
small  geographic  regions  of  the  country,  limiting  an  assessment  of  the  overall  impacts  of 
                                                 
1 See http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/1366_crop%20insurance%20letter2.htm.   4 
subsidized crop insurance.   Most research consists of cross-sectional analyses, which may be 
biased  due  to  unobserved  heterogeneity  that  drives  both  insurance  adoption  and  land-use 
decisions.  Other studies have used simulation models that rely on assumptions about farmers’ 
costs and risk aversion (e.g., Young, Vandeveer, and Schnepf 2001). 
We estimate impacts of crop insurance subsidies using data on observed changes in land 
use on individual land parcels before and after a major increase in crop insurance subsidies.  
Between 1994 and 2000, crop insurance premium subsidies were increased significantly.  The 
Federal Crop Insurance and Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994 increased premium subsidies for all 
crop insurance products, while adding a catastrophic coverage option with 100 percent premium 
subsidy and new revenue insurance options.  Further premium subsidy increases were enacted in 
1999-2000.  Average annual program costs roughly doubled to $1.5 billion between 1990-94 and 
1995-99, then doubled again to $3.1 billion after the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 
(Glauber and Collins 2002).  Most existing empirical research on crop insurance and land in crop 
production uses data that pre-date even the 1994 crop insurance subsidy increases.
2  Yet these 
subsidy changes create a natural experiment in which to measure producer insurance purchase 
and subsequent land-use decisions against an exogenous change in subsidies. 
Our  land-use  data  are  derived  from  the  1992  and  1997  Natural  Resources  Inventory 
(NRI).   The NRI is a panel survey of land use and land characteristics on non-Federal lands 
conducted at five-year intervals from 1982 to 1997 over the 48 contiguous United States.  The 
data include approximately 844,000 points, each representing a land area given by a sampling 
weight inversely proportional to the sampling intensity (Nusser and Goebel 1997).  The NRI 
collects data on the same points over time, which makes it possible to estimate both land-use 
change and the characteristics of parcels undergoing change.  These data enable measurement of 
the extent, location, and environmental characteristics of land-use change due to crop insurance 
                                                 
2 An exception is the recent study by Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004), which includes an analysis of wheat 
and barley production in the Northern Great Plains over 1997-98.     5 
subsidies, compared to the previous literature that has examined net acreage changes at national, 
state, or county levels.  
 
The Federal Crop Insurance Program 
Beginning in the 1995 crop season, the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 (FCIRA) 
modified the federal crop insurance program by authorizing the USDA to offer essentially "free" 
catastrophic coverage to producers who grow an insurable crop.
3  Catastrophic coverage insures 
production losses falling below 50% of  expected  yield, indemnified  at  55% of the expected 
market price of the insured crop.   The FCIRA allows farmers to purchase additional coverage 
that provides a higher yield or revenue protection, with the premium on this “buy-up” coverage 
subsidized  by  the  government.    For  buy-up  coverage,  producers  paid  only  a  portion  of  the 
actuarial premium plus a small administrative fee.  The share of the total premium paid by the 
government varies by coverage level.  In 1997, the typical premium subsidy share was 42% on 
the 65% buy-up coverage. 
The FCIRA had a large effect on the number of acres insured and the level of coverage 
(as measured by premiums paid).  Figure 1 shows total subsidies, total premiums, and total acres 
enrolled in the crop insurance program from 1990 to 1998.  The figure presents separate plots for 
all crops and for the three largest individual crops (in acreage): corn, soybeans, and wheat.  In 
1997, these three crops made up 78.9% of the acreage insured, 55.5% of the subsidies, 51.7% of 
the total premiums paid, and 53.8% of cultivated cropland (excluding hay).  The figure illustrates 
the marked increase in crop insurance coverage following implementation of the FCIRA and 
suggests that the bulk of this increase stemmed directly from the increase in subsidies.  There 
were large increases in premiums for most crops between 1992 and 1997.  For barley, potatoes, 
and  dry  beans,  premiums  per  acre  harvested  increased  by  about  one-third;  for  wheat  and 
                                                 
3 The premium on this level of coverage is fully subsidized by the government but farmers must pay a $50 per crop 
per county administrative fee.   6 
sorghum,  premiums  increased  by  about  one-half;  and  cotton,  corn,  and  soybean  premiums 
increased by almost two-thirds. 
Premium rates in the crop insurance program are set according to reported yield histories.  
Premiums (prior to subsidization) are nominally set at actuarially fair rates.  Because premiums 
are subsidized, participation in the program is thus nominally profitable for all farmers.  In fact, 
many argue that some premiums are set below actuarially fair rates for some farmers and above 
actuarially fair rates for other farmers (e.g., Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone 2003; Just, Calvin, 
and Quiggen 1999; Coble et al. 1996; Vandeveer and Lohman 1994; Goodwin 1993).   This 
occurs because yields are highly variable, which makes it difficult to determine actuarially fair 
premiums from often limited yield histories.  Imprecise premium rates lead to the well known 
problem of adverse selection: farmers with premiums set too low are more likely to enroll as 
compared  to  farmers  with  premiums  set  too  high.    If  farmers  do  not  have  a  yield  history, 
premiums are set according to transitional “T” yields, until yield histories have been established.  
T yields usually equal 60% of the county-average yield and may be lower or higher than farmers’ 
expected yield, which may also lead to adverse selection. 
Significant and persistent losses in the crop insurance program suggest that premiums 
are, in fact, below actuarially fair rates for a substantial number of producers (Glauber 2004).  
Just,  Calvin,  and  Quiggen  (1999)  suggest  that  the  risk  reduction  motive  for  crop  insurance 
participation is small for most producers  and that most crop insurance  participants enjoy an 
increase in average returns over time because of errors in crop insurance premium rates and 
subsidies.  Over the past decade, significant increases in premium subsidies have likely expanded 
the  group  of  producers  who  enjoy  positive  expected  (average)  returns  to  crop  insurance.  
Depending on the level of coverage purchased, premium subsidies can be as high as 67 percent, 
up  from  a  maximum  of  30  percent  prior  to  1994.
4    Further  increases  in  crop  insurance 
                                                 
4 Not including Catastrophic (CAT) coverage, which is offered at a 100 percent premium subsidy.   7 
participation rates have been associated with the increased subsidies (Dismukes and Vandeveer 
2001).  
We estimate the change in land use between 1992 and 1997 as a function of the subsidy-
induced  change  in  expected  return  to  crop  insurance.    Over  this  period,  crop  insurance  was 
dominated by actual production history (APH) contracts, although revenue insurance products 
were introduced in selected counties in 1996 and purchase of these products has grown rapidly in 
the years since.  For our empirical analysis, insurance return is computed as a weighted county-
level average across eight major crops (corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, sorghum, barley, oats, and 
rice) of the (expected) APH crop insurance indemnity minus the total crop insurance premium, 
net of the premium subsidy.   Specifically, returns and expected returns to APH crop insurance 
can be written as: 
i i i ni
i i i ni
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where ni R is the change in crop revenue due to insurance program participation;  i I  is the crop 
insurance indemnity;  i r is the (total) crop insurance premium,  i s is the premium subsidy (the 
premium  paid  by  producers  is i i s r − )  and  E  is  the  expectation  operator.      We  estimate  the 
expected indemnity as the average of indemnity payments over the previous 10 years, by county.   
Expected insurance returns for each of the eight crops are weighted based on the 1992 county 
acreage of each particular crop.   
Our  estimate  of  the  change  in  expected  return  to  crop  insurance  is  based  on  buy-up 
coverage only.  Catastrophic coverage (APH insurance with a 50% yield guarantee and 100% 
premium subsidy) was introduced in 1995.  Producers participating in farm commodity programs 
in 1995 were required to purchase at least catastrophic coverage for a small, per crop, processing 
fee.  This requirement was dropped for the 1996 and subsequent seasons, but re-enrollment was 
automatic unless producers notified agents of their intent to discontinue catastrophic coverage.  
Because catastrophic coverage was required for commodity program participants in 1995, 
its purchase does not necessarily represent an expansion of crop insurance demand due to the 
subsidy change.  In 1996, automatic re-enrollment may have caught some producers unaware   8 
resulting in larger purchases than would have otherwise been the cases.  Indeed, purchase of 
catastrophic coverage declined throughout the late 1990s, suggesting that many producers would 
not  have  purchased  catastrophic  coverage  except  for  the  commodity  program  requirement. 
Moreover, the data suggest that net return to catastrophic coverage is less than that of buy-up 
coverage,  even  with  the  100  percent  premium  subsidy,  approaching  zero  in  many  cases.  
Factoring in catastrophic coverage may actually reduce the average return to crop insurance.   
Thus, the change in expected return to buy-up coverage (coverage of 65% or higher) is likely to 
better reflect the change in expected return to crop insurance due to the subsidy increase for 
those  producers  who  made  a  positive  decision  to  purchase  crop  insurance  based  on  the 
expectation of an economic return.      
 
Modeling Land-Use Change  
Land use is driven by profitability that varies over time and space. Crop insurance subsidies 
increase the expected returns and reduce the risk of crop production and thereby provide farmers 
with an incentive to increase land in cultivated crops.  To estimate this effect, we consider a 
model of land use change that incorporates both observed and unobserved factors affecting the 
profitability of alternative uses.  
  The  landowner’s  profit  function  may  be  thought  of  as  including  both  observed  and 
unobserved components.  Using a general random utility expression, the expected net return 
(utility) to the landowner on parcel i from converting from use j to k at time t can be specified as:   
( ) ijkt ijkt U f X ε = +  
where  ijkt ε  is a random error term.  Assuming that the error terms  ijkt ε  are independent and 
identically distributed with the type I extreme value distribution yields the probability that parcel 















   9 
This is the general formulation of a conditional logit model (McFadden 1974).
5 
We assume landowners base their expectation of future net returns based on the current 
and historical net returns to each particular use.  If land-use patterns are initially in equilibrium, 
then only the changes in the relative levels of profits, and not the levels of profits themselves, 
should drive observed land-use transitions between two periods.  Although our focus is on land-
use changes over time (1992-1997), we include 1992 profit levels (as well as the 1992-1997 
changes in these levels) in our analysis because the levels will matter if land markets were in fact 
in disequilibrium in the initial period.  Because our measures of profits are not normalized to any 
one use, we also include profit levels because they indicate the relative profits among alternative 
uses.  Relative profits will matter for land-use changes if hurdles in relative rents must be crossed 
to induce landowners to convert from one land use to another.   To control for net returns to crop 
insurance in the initial period (1992), we include the county-level share of insurance program 
participation for the eight major crops considered.   Insurance participation reflects initial cross-
sectional differences in the relative returns from insurance participation. 
  Although the profits of alternative land uses for each NRI observation are not observed, 
we  have  information  on  certain  parcel-level  attributes  and  condition  our  estimates  on  these 
attributes as well as on interactions between the attributes and county-level profits and profit 
changes.  We include these interactions because lands with different attributes may be more or 
less likely to convert from one use to another, especially because our measures of relative profits 
are based on relatively coarse county-level data.  In this way, we model some within-county 
variation in land-use profits from the different activities.  The parcel-level attributes, plus an 
intercept that varies by land-use transition, also proxy for the costs of converting land from its 
current use to each of the six land-use alternatives.  These attributes include observation-specific 
indicators  of  land  quality  (Land  Capability  Class),  erodibility,  average  slope  gradient,  and 
                                                 
5 The term “conditional” logit or “discrete choice” logit (Greene 1998) is sometimes used for a logit model in which 
the independent variables vary only over the choices, in contrast to a “multinomial” logit, in which explanatory 
variables vary only over the individuals but not over the choices.  We use “conditional” logit for the more general 
model used here, which has terms varying over both choices and individuals, as it is structurally analogous to the 
conditional logit once individual characteristics are interacted with choice-specific dummy variables.    10 
flooding frequency.  Further descriptions of the model variables are provided in the following 
section.  
  We also include a polynomial trend surface unique to each land-use alternative to control 
for unobserved factors correlated with location.  This approach includes a measure of geographic 
location as an explanatory variable and is a common approach in spatial statistics (Venables and 
Ripley  1994).    This  approach  differs  from  an  approach  common  in  the  literature  on  spatial 
econometrics, which uses a spatially-autorcorrelated error structure (e.g. Anselin 1988).  Such 
spatial-autocorrelation  models  are  difficult  to  implement  with  limited  dependent  variables, 
especially in studies (like ours) with more than a few hundred observations.
6  
  We estimate separate models for each of the four starting land-uses j (cultivated crops, 
uncultivated  crops/pasture,  forests,  and  range)  that  allow  for  six  land-use  alternatives  k 
(cultivated crops, uncultivated crops or pasture, CRP, range, forest, and urban).  Each model is 
based on the same specification.  After examining several functional forms for ( ) f X , we chose a 
linear model that considers all possible two-way interactions between the parcel-level indicator 
of land quality (LCC) and the estimates of county-level levels and changes in levels of land-use 
profits.    Two-way  interactions  between  LCC  and  the  other  parcel-level  measures  are  also 
included, and other explanatory variables (described below) are included without interactions.
7  
Dropping  the  time  subscripts,  we  specify  the  component  of  utility  that  is  unique  to  each 
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where 
0
jkt α  is an alternative-specific intercept,  α ,  β and θ  are parameters,
C
jk R are net returns 
(and changes) to use k in county c, 
q
it LCC is a dummy variable indicating whether parcel i is of 
quality q at time t,
 and 
s
jk x and 
c
jk x denote other explanatory variables measured at the parcel-
                                                 
6 A limited dependent variable model with spatial autocorrelation could be estimated using simulation methods.  
However, this is very computationally expensive. Unlike the spatial-autocorrelation model, a polynomial surface is 
easier to estimate, does not assume unobserved factors are uncorrelated with observable factors, and does not 
impose spatial correlations that are inversely associated with sampling density. 
7 The choice of these additional parcel and county-level variables was determined through a process in which terms 
were dropped and added successively in order to minimize the Akaike (1974) information criterion (AIC).   11 
specific and county-level, respectively.   
  CRP participation depends on a different set of decisions than other land-use choices, 
because enrollment depends on both the landowner’s bid, which includes a proposed rental rate, 
and the government’s choice of whether to accept the bid, which depends on the environmental 
characteristics of a parcel as well as the cost.   Because the program targets cropland retirement, 
CRP rental rates are highly correlated with the profitability of cropping in a given locality.  We 
account for the effect of crop net returns on the incentive to remain in cropland.  Incentives to 
enroll in CRP are specified as a function of LCC, the other parcel-level variables, and a spatial 
trend surface unique to this alternative.  Lower land quality as measured by LCC has always 
been  strongly  associated  with  program  eligibility  so  we  would  expect  greater  enrollment  on 
lower quality lands. 
The econometric model described  above  estimates the probability that an NRI parcel 
transitions  from  its  current  use  to  any  of  six  major  land-use  alternatives  (cultivated  crops, 
uncultivated crops and pasture, CRP, range, forest, and urban) between 1992 and 1997.   To 
identify the magnitude of these effects, parameters from the model are used to simulate 1997 
land use under a hypothetical case in which there was no change in crop insurance subsidies over 
the previous five years.   The difference between land use under this scenario and land use in 
reality  —  which  reflects  the  effects  of  the  actual  1992-97  change  in  insurance  returns  — 
provides  an  estimate  of  the  land-use  effects  of  the  1994  change  in  crop  insurance  premium 
subsidies.
8     
  In the simulations, land-use change probabilities are estimated for each NRI observation 
in  the  sample  based  on  the  estimated  parameters.    These  probabilities  are  multiplied  by  the 
acreage weight for each observation to estimate the amount of land transitioning from each initial 
                                                 
8 In our analysis, we do not compare land use under the counterfactual scenario of no crop insurance subsidy 
increase to the observed patterns of land use reported in the 1997 NRI.  Rather, we compare the counterfactual 
scenario to land use under a simulated “factual” baseline predicted from our estimated parameters fitted with the 
actually observed values for the change in insurance returns and all other variables.  In this way, we produce 
estimates of the land-use impacts of the change in crop insurance returns that are internally consistent within the 
framework of the econometric model.      12 
use  to  each  of  the  six  land-use  alternatives.      These  amounts  are  also  used  as  weights  in 
determining mean land characteristics of acres affected by the crop insurance subsidy increases 
 
Data  
The likelihood that a land unit transitions from one land use to another is estimated based on 
repeated observations of non-federal land use from the National Resources Inventory (NRI).  Our 
analysis is based on a subset of 657,781 observations from the NRI that consists of lands that 
were in cultivated crops; uncultivated crops and pasture; forest; or range in 1992 and any of our 
six alternative uses in 1997.  The land base in our analysis comprises about 1.3 billion acres, 
representing about 69% of non-federal land in the contiguous United States. 
Crop insurance program data are available from the Risk Management Agency (RMA), 
USDA.  The data include total indemnities, total premiums, and the subsidy by crop, insurance 
product,  and  county.    We  constructed  the  land-use  profit  variables  (and  changes  in  these 
variables) using county-level data derived from a number of sources to approximate revenues 
less  variable  costs  for  each  the  six  land-use  activities  (see  Appendix).      In  addition  to  our 
measure of net returns from urban development, we include the 1990 "urban influence" code for 
the  centroid  of  each  county.    This  variable  is  a  distance-weighted  measure  of  access  to 
population centers based on the 1990 Census and is included as an additional proxy for urban 
development  pressures,  given  the  coarse  nature  of  our  urban  profit  estimates  (Heimlich  and 
Anderson 2001).
9     In  addition  to  crop  net  returns  derived  from  the  market,  government 
payments for 1997 are included as a proxy for prior participation in government commodity 
programs and the effect of the major policy change that "decoupled" these commodity payments 
in 1996.  The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) removed most 
conditions  on  plantings  and  conditioned  payments  on  prior  planting  histories  as  opposed  to 
                                                 
9 Interaction terms between the urban influence code and the urban net returns (and changes) are also included.   13 
current planting decisions.  As a result, payments received in 1997 are an indication of program 
participation prior to 1996 and the resulting “base acres” assigned under the 1996 Act.   
Summary  statistics  are  provided  for  each  of  our  county  and  parcel-specific  variables 
(tables 1 and 2).  To control for unobserved factors correlated with location, we estimate models 
with  a  spatial  polynomial  surface  trend.    To  estimate  this  trend,  we  assign  to  each  point  a 
measure of location, proxied by longitude and latitude coordinates for the centroid of each NRI 
polygon.
10   We include these coordinates (interacted with an alternative-specific constant) singly 




The included variables explain a significant share of the variation in land-use changes, with 
pseudo R
2 measures ranging from 0.71 to 0.86.  The estimated parameters are consistent with 
economic  intuition,  with  the  profits  variables  (and  changes  in  profits)  for  each  land-use 
alternative  generally  significant  and  positively  associated  with  a  greater  likelihood  of 
transitioning to each respective use.
12 
  The change in crop insurance returns, all else equal, is positively related to the likelihood 
that land transitioned to cultivated cropland from another use as well as the likelihood that land 
that was cultivated in 1992 remained cultivated in 1997.  The counterfactual analysis (with the 
change  in  insurance  net  returns  assumed  zero)  indicates  that  the  change  in  crop  insurance 
premium subsidies in the mid 1990s increased total cultivated cropland area in 1997 by roughly 
1.9 million acres or 0.64 percent, with the bulk of this land (1.5 million acres) coming at the 
expense of uncultivated crops, pasture, and range (table 3). 
                                                 
10 NRI polygons are land areas defined by the intersections of all counties and 9-digit watershed classifications.  To 
protect the confidentiality of landowners sampled by the NRI, more specific location indicators are not publicly 
available. 
11 Denoting the location coordinates as x and y, we include x, y, xx, yy, xy, xxx, yyy, xxy, and xyy as explanatory 
variables. For the equations for the CRP and range choices, only a second-order surface could be estimated due to 
the smaller number of observations. 
12 For brevity, given the large number of variables and equations, individual parameter estimates are not reported but 
are available from the authors upon request.    14 
  The  added  croplands  due  to  the  higher  insurance  subsidies  are  located  largely  in  the 
Prairie  Gateway  region  (roughly  the  Southern  and  Central  Plains)  up  through  Northeast 
Wyoming,  Western  Nebraska,  and  South  Dakota.    Additional  clusters  are  in  the  Mississippi 
Portal, along the Eastern Seaboard, and to a lesser extent in the Central Valley of California.   
The  Heartland  (Missouri,  Iowa,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio)  has  virtually  no  estimated  lands  in 
production due to the change in crop insurance subsidies.  This pattern can perhaps be explained 
by  variation  in  the  actuarial  performance  of  the  crop  insurance  program.    In  particular,  the 
actuarial performance of the federal crop insurance program has historically been better for corn 
and soybeans in the Midwest, and poorer for cotton in the Southern Plains (Young, Vandeveer, 
and Schnepf 2001). As one would expect, we see lands shifting into crop cultivation as a result 
of crop insurance in areas where crop insurance is a better deal for farmers (e.g. the actuarial 
performance is worse), and few shifts in areas where the actuarial performance has been better. 
 
Discussion 
Most researchers who have studied the impact of crop insurance on land use have found that 
land-use effects are small, on the order of 1-2 million acres (Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal 
2004;  Young,  Vandeveer,  and  Schnepf  2001).  One  study  —  an  unpublished  manuscript  by 
Keeton, Skees, and Long (2000) — argues that the increase in crop insurance subsidies during 
the mid-1990s led to the introduction of 15 million new cropland acres (50 million if land in 
CRP is included) or about 5 percent of cultivated cropland. 
Our  estimates  are  not  directly  comparable  to  previous  studies.    Compared  to  other 
studies, we use data from a more recent time period and focus only on the impacts of the 1992-
97 changes in the crop insurance subsidies, rather the overall impacts of the crop insurance 
program  as  a  whole.    Nevertheless,  our  estimates  likely  capture  a  significant  share  of  the 
program’s overall impact given that crop insurance participation and total premiums more than 
doubled over the 1992-97 period.  During these years, insured acreage increased from 83 to 182 
million  acres  while  total  premiums  increased  from  0.7  to  $1.8  billion  (Glauber  and  Collins   15 
2002).  If the program’s impact on acreage is assumed to be proportional to the total premium 
levels, our estimated effect of the 1992-97 subsidy change would capture about 57% of the 
overall effect of the total crop insurance program, which would thus be 3.3 million acres (1.1% 
of total cultivated cropland).  This estimate is larger than other estimates, based on a policy 
simulation model, that insurance subsidies in 2000 increased total planted cropland area by about 
1 million acres or 0.6% (Young, Vandeveer, and Schnepf 2001).   However, our estimated effect 
of the 1992-97 subsidy change is in the range of the most recent empirical estimates that a 30% 
increase in premium subsidies (more than twice the 1992-97 change) would increase acreage of 
major crops from 0.2 to 1.1% (Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal 2004).
13 
In general, the analysis indicates that crop insurance effects are largest for low quality 
and some environmentally sensitive land.  When compared with national average for overall 
cultivated cropland, our estimate of land retained in cultivated crops due to subsidy increases 
includes disproportionately large shares of low quality (high LCC) land and highly erodible land 
(table 4).
14   For example, an estimated 36 percent of acres retained in crops due to insurance 
subsidies were highly erodible versus 25 percent of cropland overall.   
Our findings also lend some support to claims that lands brought into production due to 
crop insurance subsidies are more likely to lie in floodplains and, in the case of wetlands, on 
environmentally sensitive ecosystems than croplands overall.  Our estimates indicate that the 
additional  croplands  due  to  the  crop  insurance  subsidy  increases  have  a  higher  incidence  of 
frequent  flooding  as  well  as  a  greater  share  of  wetland  acreage  than  the  average  cultivated 
cropland nationally (tables 4).   Total wetlands cropped as a result of the 1992-97 crop insurance 
subsidy increase are estimated at 86 thousand acres, roughly 1.6 percent of the 5.4 million acres 
of wetlands under crop cultivation.  From a different perspective, these 86 thousand acres are 
about half of the 163 million acre net loss in non-federal wetland area between 1992 and 1997 
                                                 
13 Premium subsidies for the 65% coverage level were set at 30%, 42% and 59%, respectively, under the major crop 
insurance acts of 1980, 1994, and 2000 (Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal 2004).  Linearly scaling their estimates 
upwards to reflect a 42% change suggests cropland increases from 0.3 to 1.5% compared to 0.6% from our analysis. 
14 Given the relatively small numbers of land parcels affected by the change in crop insurance subsidies, local 
comparisons are not statistically significant and are not reported.   16 
(USDA-NRCS  2000).    Ending  crop  production  on  these  acres  and  restoring  them  to  better 
wetland condition could make a difference in the overall loss of wetland function.  Of course, 




We  investigated  the  acreage  response  to  the  1994  crop  insurance  premium  increases  by 
estimating the change in crop acreage between 1992 and 1997 as a function of this exogenous 
change in expected return to crop insurance.  A conditional logit model including six land major 
uses (crops, pasture, CRP, range, forest, and urban) is estimated for the entire coterminous U.S.  
Using the estimated parameters, we perform a counter-factual analysis to estimate land use in the 
absence  of  the  crop  insurance  subsidy  increase.    Results  from  counter-factual  simulations 
indicate that the increase in crop insurance premium subsidies increased cultivated cropland area 
on the order of 1.9 million acres (0.6%), consistent with the lower range of previous estimates of 
crop insurance acreage effects.  The estimated additional lands in production due to the change in 
insurance subsidies are of lower quality than cropland overall in term of both Land Capability 
Classification and proneness to flooding, as well as more environmentally sensitive in terms of 
erodibility and proportion designated as wetlands. 
Given this evidence that crop insurance encourages crop production on land that is both 
economically and environmentally marginal, crop insurance subsidies may be working at cross 
purposes to agri-environmental programs such as the CRP, as other researchers have suggested 
(e.g. Goodwin and Smith 2003).  That is true to the extent that land which has been retained in 
cultivated crops due to the crop insurance subsidy increase is also targeted for CRP enrollment.  
In the case of highly erodible land, acres estimated to be retained in crop production due to crop 
insurance and acres enrolled in CRP are both, on average, more erodible than overall cropland 
(table 4).  That is not true of wetland or land subject to frequent flooding.  While land estimated 
to be retained in crops due to the insurance subsidy increase is more likely than overall cropland   17 
to contain these land types, CRP is less likely to enroll these lands (table 4).  Moreover, the 
spatial  distribution  of  CRP  enrollments  is  somewhat  different  from  that  of  the  estimated 
additional croplands resulting from the 1992-97 increase in crop insurance premium subsidies 
(figure 2).  The lands in production due to the change in subsidies (the red dots) are clustered in 
certain regions and not uniformly spread through the areas of CRP (the green dots). 
These results suggest that increasing crop insurance subsidies may be working at cross-
purposes to CRP in terms of encouraging crop production on erodible lands.  By encouraging 
production in wetland areas, increasing subsidies may also be undermining broader program 
goals in terms of wildlife habitat protection.  Nevertheless, the overall estimate of cropland area 
affected by the change in crop insurance subsidies in the mid 1990s is relatively small relative to 
the cropland base and the 34 million acres in CRP.  As a result, the aggregate environmental 
impacts attributable to the increase in insurance subsidies are probably modest, though local 
effects may be significant.    
We have no information on how the environmental costs of crop insurance subsidies 
compare to the insurance benefits at either national or local levels.  Nevertheless, our results 
could help identify the areas where the tradeoffs might be greatest.  Conservation efforts could 
perhaps  yield greater benefits if they were specially targeted to those areas where insurance 
policies are having the greatest impact.  While our study focused on the change in insurance 
subsidies between 1992 and 1997, premium subsidies were increased further in 1999 and 2000.  
To the extent that the marginal effects of crop insurance subsidies are non-linear, these latest 
subsidies might have greater or smaller effects per dollar than those identified in our analysis.  
When  micro-data  from  the  NRI’s  annual  surveys  for  2001-2005  become  available,  future 
research could apply a similar methodology to examine the impact of this latest round of crop 
insurance subsidy increases.    18 
Figure 1. Insurance Coverage of all Crops and Largest Individual crops in Years Before 
and After the Federal Crop Insurance and Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994 
 
Source: Risk Management Agency (RMA).   19 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics: County-Level Variables 
 
County-Level Variable  No. of 
Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Crop net returns in 1992 
($/acre/year)  657,781  16.9  51.1  -829.2  294.3 
Pasture net returns in 1992 
($/acre/year)  657,781  -3.0  76.3  -599.8  200.3 
Forest net returns in 1992 
($/acre/year)  657,781  6.9  9.8  -1.2  92.6 
Range net returns in 1992 
($/acre/year)  657,781  9.0  10.3  0.0  73.9 
Urban net returns in 1992 
($/acre/year)  657,781  2,224  2892  183  3,6944 
Urban influence code in 1990 
  657,781  1.40  0.89  1  5 
Total government payments in 
1997 ($/acre/year)  657,781  8.4  5.9  0.0  47.3 
% of eligible crop acres insured in 
1992   657,781  0.4  2.6  0.0  92.0 
Change in Insurance net returns, 
1992-1997 ($/acre/year)  657,781  1.8  4.3  -37.1  40.2 
Change in crop net returns,  
1992-1997 ($/acre/year)  657,781  15.1  62.9  -819.1  939.0 
Change in pasture net returns, 
1992-1997 ($/acre/year)  657,781  2.2  5.4  -8.2  52.0 
Change in forest net returns,  
1992-1997 ($/acre/year)  657,781  0.2  2.4  -8.6  12.3 
Change in range net returns,  
1992-1997 ($/acre/year)  657,781  36.2  65.5  -175.2  575.5 
Change in urban net returns,  
1992-1997 ($/acre/year)  657,781  14.1  891  -1610  10769 
 
Source: Various sources described in the Appendix.  20 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics: Observation-Specific Variables 
 
NRI Point-Level Variable  No. of 
Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Land in cultivated crops in 1992 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.25  0.44  0  1 
Land in uncultivated crops/ pasture 
in 1992 (yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Land in forests in 1992 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Land in range in 1992 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Land in cultivated crops in 1997 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.25  0.43  0  1 
Land in uncultivated crops/ pasture 
in 1997 (yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.13  0.33  0  1 
Land in forests in 1997 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Land in range in 1997 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Land in CRP in 1997 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.00  0.04  0  1 
Land in urban use in 1997 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.01  0.09  0  1 
Land Capability Class 1-2 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Land Capability Class 3-4 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Land Capability Class 5-8 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.43  0.49  0  1 
Highly erodible land  
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.44  0.49  0  1 
Land prone to frequent flooding 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.04  0.18  0  1 
Slope % greater than 15 
a 
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Land irrigated  
(yes=1, no=0)  657,781  0.05  0.22  0  1 
Acreage weight (NRI xfact in 
acres)  657,781  1,980  2,368  100  192,200 
 
a Lands with slope percentages greater than 15 are considered as having “strong” to “very steep” slopes. 
Source: 1997 National Resources Inventory.  Observations were included if they were in cultivated crops, 
uncultivated crops, pasture, forests, or range uses in 1992 and in cultivated crops, uncultivated crops, 
pasture, forests, range, CRP or urban uses  in 1997.   21 
 




















A  B  A-B  100*(A-B)/A 
Cultivated Crops  300,639  298,725  1,914  0.64% 
Uncultivated 
Crops and Pasture  181,257  181,473  -1,216  -0.67% 
Forest  391,534  391,581  -47  -0.01% 
Urban  69,672  69,967  -294  -0.42% 
CRP  35,721  35,696  -24  -0.07% 
Range  400,294  400,627  -333  -0.08% 
 
Source: 1997 National Resources Inventory and estimates from this study.   22 
  





Predicted Land in 
Cultivation in 1997 




Cropland in 1997  CRP Land in 1997 
% LCC 1-2  43%  56%  23% 
% LCC 3-4  41%  40%  65% 
% LCC 5-8  16%  4%  12% 
% Highly Erodible  36%  25%  56% 
% Wetland-  Cowardin  4.5%  2.5%  1.8% 
% Frequently Flooded  2.7%  1.8%  0.9% 
 
Source: 1997 National Resources Inventory and estimates from this study   23 
Figure 2. Location of CRP Enrollments and of Additional Cropland Estimated Due to Crop Insurance Subsidy Increases  
  Source: 1997 National Resources Inventory and estimates from this study.   References 
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 Appendix: County-Level Land-Use Profits 
 
Crop Net Returns:  Data on prices, yields, costs, and acres are used to compute a weighted 
county-level average of the net returns per acre for 21 major crops.
  State-level marketing-year-
average  prices  and  county-level  yields  are  from  the  National  Agricultural  Statistics  Service 
(NASS).  Landowners are assumed to form expectations of future land-use returns based on 
current prices and the average of yields over the previous five years.  Data on cash costs as a 
share of revenue at the state and regional level, respectively, are from the Census of Agriculture 
and the Economic Research Service’s (ERS).  County acreage from NASS and the Census of 
Agriculture provided weights for averaging across individual crops. 
 
Government Payments:  County-level estimates of total federal program payments per acre are 
from the Census of Agriculture and include receipts from deficiency payments, support price 
payments, indemnity programs, disaster payments, and payments for soil and water conservation 
projects.  Conservation Reserve and Wetlands Reserve program payments are excluded.   
Pasture Net Returns:  Annual net returns per acre for pasture are estimated using pasture yields 
from the SOILS-5 database linked to the NRI, state prices for “other hay” from NASS, and per 
acre costs for hay and other field crops from the Census of Agriculture. 
 
Range Net Returns: Annual rangeland net returns per acre are computed with forage yields from 
SOILS-5 and state-level per head grazing rates for private lands from ERS. 
 
Forest Net Returns:  We use a 5 percent interest rate to annualize the estimated net present value 
of a weighted average of sawtimber revenues from different forest types based on prices, yields, 
costs, and acres.  State-level stumpage prices were gathered from state and federal agencies and 
private data services.  Regional merchantable timber yield estimates for different forest types 
were obtained from Richard Birdsey of the U.S. Forest Service.  Regional replanting and annual 
management costs were derived from Moulton and Richards (1990) and Dubois, McNabb and 
Straka (1999).  The Faustmann formula was used to compute the optimal rotation age, assuming 
forests start newly planted at year zero.  County acreage and timber output data from the Forest 
Inventory  and Analysis (FIA) and Timber Product Output (TPO) surveys of the U.S. Forest 
Service provided weights for averaging across individual forest types and species, respectively. 
 
Urban Net Returns: Annual urban net returns per acre are estimated as the median value of a 
recently-developed parcel, less the value of structures, annualized at a 5 percent interest rate.  
Median county-level prices for single family homes were constructed from the decennial Census 
of Population and Housing Public Use Microdata Samples and the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) House Price Index.   Regional data on lot sizes and the value of 
land relative to structures for single-family homes were from the Characteristics of New Housing 
Reports (C-25 series) and the Survey of Construction (SOC) micro data from the Census Bureau. 
 
Further  descriptions  of  these  data  are  provided  in  Lubowski  (2002)  and  are  available  upon 
request. 